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NOT ALL SECURITIZATIONS ARE EQUAL:  RISK 
RETENTION FOR COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIZATION IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Commercial real estate (“CRE”)1 projects may be funded through 
a variety of financing avenues2: one of the most significant of which is 
commercial mortgage-backed securitization (“CMBS”).3  Similar to 
other forms of securitization,4 CMBS opens capital markets5 as an alter-
native financing resource for CRE, thereby increasing access to capital.6  
Since the inception of CMBS transactions in the early 1990s,7 and until 
the financial crisis of 2008, the CMBS industry was strong and 
 
 1. Commercial real estate (“CRE”) refers to “ ’income-producing properties that are 
managed for economic profit,’ such as apartments, shopping centers, hotels, restaurants, ware-
houses, and offices.”  Alan Kronovet, Note, An Overview of Commercial Mortgage Backed 
Securitization:  The Devil is in the Details, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 288, 288 (1997) [hereinafter 
Overview of CMBS] (quoting David P. Jacob & Kimbell R. Duncan, Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securities, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 491, 491 (Frank J. 
Fabozzi ed., 4th ed. 1995) (footnote omitted)). 
 2. For example, CRE may be financed through traditional lending, where the lender 
views the loan transaction as a long-term investment and holds the mortgage through maturity.  
Id. at 297.  Alternatively, CRE may be financed through commercial mortgage-backed secu-
ritization, where the lender sells the mortgage shortly after its origination.  Id. 
 3. See infra Part II.  Throughout this note, “CMBS” is used to refer to both commercial 
mortgage-backed securitization (in both the singular and plural forms) and commercial mort-
gage-backed securities, depending on the surrounding context.  The former refers to the se-
curitization process, while the latter refers to the transferable securities themselves.  See infra 
Part II.A–B. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. A “capital market” is “[a] securities market in which stocks and bonds with long-term 
maturities are traded.”  Capital Market, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 6. Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to 
Credit:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity and the Subcomm. on 
Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit, 108th Cong., at 6 (2003) (statement of Cameron L. Cowan, 
Partner, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, on behalf of the Am. Securitization Forum) 
[hereinafter Am. Securitization Forum], http://archives-financialservices.house.gov/me-
dia/pdf/110503cc.pdf. 
 7. Patrick C. Sargent & Michael D. Jewesson, The Dawn of CMBS 4.0:  Changes and 
Challenges in a New Regulatory Regime, ALSTON & BIRD 1 (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.al-
ston.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2016/10/the-dawn-of-cmbs-40-changes-and-
challenges-in-a-ne/files/thedawnofcmbs40/fileattachment/thedawnofcmbs40.pdf; Overview 
of CMBS, supra note 1, at 296. 
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experienced steady growth.8  In fact, by 2007, approximately one-third of 
all CRE financing was obtained through CMBS.9  However, the prosper-
ous run for CMBS came to a screeching halt when disaster struck in the 
financial crisis of 2008,10 and the entire securitization industry and its 
lack of significant regulation11 came into the spotlight.12   
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(“Dodd-Frank”),13 which, among other things, introduced a number of 
new regulations that affect CMBS and other asset-backed securitization 
(“ABS”)14 transactions.15  These new regulations include increased dis-
closure requirements,16 credit rating agency reform,17 capital 
 
 8. See Alan Kronovet & Chris van Heerden, Chapter 2 in the History of CMBS:  Coming 
to Terms with the New Rules, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 67, 70–71 (2016) (providing chart (“Ex-
hibit 2:  CMBS Issuance Reached $94.6 billion in 2015”) depicting a relatively constant in-
crease in issuance of CMBS between 1993 and 2007, substantial decline in 2008 and 2009, 
but subsequent steady increase). 
 9. Id. at 68–69. 
 10. See id. at 68–69 (stating that the “long run of continued growth” that the CMBS in-
dustry experienced “came to an end with the 2008 financial crisis”); see also THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, JERRY W. MARKHAM & JOHN F. COYLE, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISES:  CASES AND MATERIALS 673 n.7 (West Acad., 4th ed. 2016) (“The United States 
faced one of the gravest economic crises in history in 2008 after a slump in the real estate 
market caused massive losses to many of the nation’s largest financial institutions.”). 
 11. Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at 1. 
 12. See Robert A. Brown, Financial Reform and the Subsidization of Sophisticated In-
vestors’ Ignorance in Securitization Markets, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 105, 113–15, 124–25 
(2010) (stating that the mortgage-backed security “success story ended . . . with the unex-
pected 2007 failure of a Bear Stearns-managed hedge fund comprised of subprime RMBS”); 
Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that structured finance was blamed for the 
2008 financial crisis); Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 77 (“The financial crisis 
emanated from subprime mortgages but called into question CMBS valuation and market 
practices.”). 
 13. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 14. See infra Part III (defining ABS). 
 15. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank, tit. IX, subtit. D, 124 Stat. at 1890–98 (“Subtitle D—Improve-
ments to the [ABS] Process”). 
 16. See Dodd-Frank § 942(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c) (requiring “detailed periodic asset-level 
disclosures” (quoting Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 87)); § 945, 12 U.S.C. § 
77g(d) (requiring “disclosure detailing an issuer’s pre-securitization asset review process” 
(quoting Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 87)); § 943, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (requiring 
“disclosure of loan repurchase requests” and “a summary to be provided by the rating agencies 
describing how the representations, warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in a particular 
deal differ from other similar issuances” (quoting Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 
87)). 
 17. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank tit. IX, subtit. C, 124 Stat. at 1872–90 (“Subtitle C—Improve-
ments to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies”); Dodd-Frank § 943, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 
(requiring rating agencies to include report of the “representations, warranties, and enforce-
ment mechanisms available to investors[] and . . . how they differ from the representations, 
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requirements,18 and a 5% credit risk-retention requirement.19  The latter 
of these regulations—the risk-retention requirement—is perhaps the most 
impactful Dodd-Frank regulation.20  
Although Dodd-Frank brought widespread reform across the en-
tire U.S. financial system, it nevertheless “focused on securitization as 
the target of legislative and regulatory attention.”21  The new securitiza-
tion regulations under Dodd-Frank were specifically intended to serve as 
“improvements to the [ABS] process”22 in order to ensure the “continued 
viability of the [ABS] markets.”23  However, Dodd-Frank immediately 
faced criticism, as it was “astonishingly vague,”24 yet gave expansive au-
thority to regulatory agencies to enact new rules.25  Specifically, with re-
gard to securitization, Dodd-Frank’s ABS regulations have been criti-
cized26 because they broadly applied to ABS, in general, without 
 
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar securities . . .” which is to 
accompany any credit rating of ABS). 
 18. Dodd-Frank § 171(b)(7)(B)(i), 124 Stat. at 1438; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Secu-
ritization and Post-Crisis Financial Regulation, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 115, 118–20 (2016) 
(examining the regulatory responses of the United States and Europe after 2008 financial cri-
sis, noting that the United States responded with increasing disclosure and risk retention re-
quirements, rating agency reform, and imposing capital requirements). 
 19. Dodd-Frank § 941, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b). 
 20. See Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 86 (stating that Dodd-Frank’s risk-
retention requirement is the “most significant securitization reform”); see also Floyd Norris, 
Mortgages Without Risk, at Least for the Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2013), https://www.ny-
times.com/2013/11/29/business/mortgages-without-risk-at-least-for-the-banks.html?_r=0 
(stating that Barney Frank, Dodd-Frank co-author, considers the risk-retention requirement to 
be “the single most important part” of Dodd-Frank). 
 21. Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 86. 
 22. Dodd-Frank tit. IX, subtit. D, 124 Stat. at 1890–98 (“Subtitle D—Improvements to 
the [ABS] Process”). 
 23. Dodd-Frank § 941(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 1896. 
 24. Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, 7 NAT’L AFF. 39 (2011), https://www.na-
tionalaffairs.com/publications/detail/government-by-waiver (“The 848-page law creates a 
host of new regulatory agencies and powers to oversee the financial industry.  Addressed to a 
sector of the economy in which clear and predictable rules are especially important, the law 
is astonishingly vague and broad, leaving regulators—including new agencies with no expe-
rience or track record—with unprecedented freedom to draw up the rules.”). 
 25. Id.  This is problematic because, as Justice Powell once explained, “[t]he rulemaking 
power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of the federal stat-
ute is not the power to make law.  Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into 
effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.”  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 213–14, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1391 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, 
if Congress enacts a statute—such as Dodd-Frank—which essentially writes administrative 
agencies a blank check for determining the scope of their authority, unnecessary and overly-
expansive regulations should be expected to follow. 
 26. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 116 (stating that there is a lack of differentiation 
between the different mortgage asset classes in academic legal literature and in Dodd-Frank 
and arguing that “the causes of the RMBS market’s failure are not applicable to the CMBS 
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acknowledging key distinctions between the different types of securitiza-
tion transactions.27  Such broad application necessarily assumes uni-
formity among the various forms of securitization transactions that fall 
under the umbrella of Dodd-Frank’s definition of ABS.28  But not all se-
curitization transactions are equal.29 
While there is no doubt that ABS played a significant role in the 
2008 financial crisis, it is evident that CMBS were far less to blame than 
other ABS,30 such as collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”)31 and resi-
dential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”).32  Additionally, there 
were dozens of other contributing factors that also played significant roles 
in the 2008 financial crisis, such as the failure of the rating agencies,33 
 
market”); Tyler R. Morgan, The Refinancing Crisis in Commercial Real Estate: Dodd-Frank 
Threatens to Curtail CMBS Lending, 13 TENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 364 (2012) (“Dodd-Frank itself 
fails to adequately differentiate between the residential mortgage-backed securities 
(“RMBS”) and CMBS markets.”). 
 27. Brown, supra note 12, at 114, 116; accord Morgan, supra note 26, at 364; see, e.g., 
Dodd-Frank tit. IX, subtit. D, 124 Stat. at 1890–98 (“Subtitle D—Improvements to the [ABS] 
Process”). 
 28. See Brown, supra note 12, at 133 (stating that the differences between CMBS and 
RMBS have provided CMBS investors with more protections); see also Morgan, supra note 
26, at 364 (“[T]he policy concerns behind the risk retention and mandatory disclosure require-
ments under Dodd-Frank do not exist in the CMBS market because the product structure of 
CMBS currently provides sufficient investor protections.”); supra Part III (providing Dodd-
Frank’s definition of ABS). 
 29. Brown, supra note 12, at 133; accord Morgan, supra note 26, at 364; see also infra 
Part IV (discussing distinctions between CMBS and other forms of securitization). 
 30. Morgan, supra note 26, at 364; accord Brown, supra note 12, at 114.  
 31. A collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) “is a structured financial product that pools 
together cash flow-generating assets and repackages this asset pool into discrete tranches that 
can be sold to investors.”  Collateralized Debt Obligation – CDO, INVESTOPEDIA [hereinafter 
INVESTOPEDIA], https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).  
For more information about CDOs, see infra notes 232–37 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Morgan, supra note 26, at 364 (noting Dodd-Frank’s failure to sufficiently dis-
tinguish CMBS from other ABS); accord Brown, supra note 12, at 114.  In contrast to CMBS, 
which are solely comprised of commercial mortgages, RMBS are solely comprised of resi-
dential mortgages, but are nevertheless another form of ABS. 
 33. See Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation, and 
Regulatory-Capital Arbitrage, 47 FIN. MGMT. 175, 175, 194–96 (2018), https://onlineli-
brary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fima.12183 (concluding that little to nothing changed in 
CMBS markets—including quality of individual CMBS structures—in the years leading up 
to the 2008 financial crisis other than the “rating agencies’ persistent reductions in subordi-
nation levels”).  The major credit rating agencies are referred to as the “Big Three,” which 
includes Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”), Standard & Poor’s Global Ratings 
(“S&P”), and Fitch Ratings (“Fitch”).  Shankar Ramakrishnan & Philip Scipio, Big Three 
Credit Ratings Still Dominate Business, REUTERS (May 4, 2016, 2:50 PM), https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/uscorpbonds-ratings-idUSL2N17U1L4.  These credit rating agencies, which 
provide credit ratings, research, and risk analysis for the financial markets, MOODY’S 
INVESTORS SERVICE, https://www.moodys.com/Pages/atc.aspx (last visited Jan 3, 2019), are 
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which have also seen heightened regulation under Dodd-Frank, as well 
as predatory and fraudulent lending practices in the residential mortgage 
market.34  These factors, among many others, undermine the logic of 
leaving CMBS subject to current regulatory scheme promulgated under 
Dodd-Frank.35   
Over ten years have passed since the heart of the 2008 financial 
crisis,36 approximately eight years since the passage of Dodd-Frank,37 and 
approximately two years since Dodd-Frank’s risk-retention requirement 
went into full effect for CMBS.38  In conjunction with the lapse in time 
since the 2008 financial crisis and Dodd-Frank’s controversial nature,39 
the election of President Donald J. Trump with partisan control of Con-
gress birthed an era of deregulation.40 
On February 3, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 
13772, setting forth core principles with which financial regulations 
 
said to “play a critical ‘gatekeeper’ role in the debt market.”  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 931(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012). 
 34. Brown, supra note 12, at 116; see also Stanton & Wallace, supra note 33, at 175 
(noting lack of evidence of “dishonesty on the part of borrowers and lenders” in the CMBS 
market, unlike RMBS market). 
 35. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at 10 (“Commentators to the proposed banking 
regulations do not question the need for some degree of regulation, rather they raise concerns 
about its growing complexity, redundancy, and negative impact on the availability of capital 
and liquidity. . . .”). 
 36. See Joel Haveman, The Financial Crisis of 2008, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Feb. 
2, 2009), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Financial-Crisis-of-2008-The-1484264 (discuss-
ing timeline of surrounding circumstances leading up to 2008 financial crisis). 
 37. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 38. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 
43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267) (stating risk-retention requirement 
became effective on December 24, 2015 for ABS collateralized by residential mortgages (i.e., 
RMBS), and December 24, 2016 for all other ABS (e.g., CMBS)). 
 39. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES:  CAPITAL MARKETS 91, 101 (Oct. 2017) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT], 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-System-Capi-
tal-Markets-FINAL-FINAL.pdf (“The imposition of securitizer or sponsor risk retention re-
quirements has generated substantial controversy among market participants.”); see, e.g., Mil-
ton Ezrati, Dodd-Frank Desperately Needs More Reform, FORBES (Aug. 21 2018, 3:15 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2018/08/21/dodd-frank-desperately-needs-more-
reform/?source=299loomberg#4f6379c18c6e (stating Dodd-Frank, at best, has created as 
many problems as it has solved, thereby leaving the U.S. susceptible to another financial cri-
sis, and while reform efforts are taking place, they only scratch the surface of what needs to 
be done); see also Alan Rappeport & Emily Flitter, Congress Approves First Big Dodd-Frank 
Rollback, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/business/con-
gress-passes-dodd-frank-rollback-for-smaller-banks.html (highlighting partisan polarization 
as to whether Dodd-Frank’s regulations are necessary). 
 40. See, e.g., Rappeport & Flitter, supra note 39 (stating that President Trump “promised 
to ‘do a big number on Dodd-Frank’ ”). 
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should be consistent, including “mak[ing] regulation[s] efficient, effec-
tive, and appropriately tailored.”41  In accordance with Executive Order 
13772, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“the Treasury”) conducted 
a study and issued a subsequent report, which indicated the current regu-
latory regime that largely stemmed from Dodd-Frank is overly expansive 
and damaging to the securitization markets.42  On May 24, 2018, Con-
gress passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer 
Protection Act—the first major rollbacks of Dodd-Frank43—which Pres-
ident Trump unsurprisingly signed into law.44  Even with the recent shift 
away from a Republican supermajority in Congress,45 deregulation ef-
forts will likely remain constant,46 and additional Dodd-Frank rollbacks 
are almost certainly inevitable.47  Therefore, as discussions about Dodd-
Frank modifications and rollbacks continue, focus should turn to the risk-
retention requirement and the lack of exemptions for deserving CMBS 
transactions.48  
Proceeding in seven parts, this Note examines distinctions be-
tween CMBS and other ABS, highlights the Treasury’s findings that 
Dodd-Frank’s securitization reform damages CMBS and the securitiza-
tion industry as a whole, and thus argues that CMBS should not remain 
subject to the current risk-retention rules that were imposed under Dodd-
 
 41. Exec. Order No. 13772:  Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial 
System, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965, 9965–66 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 42. See TREASURY REPORT, supra note 39, at 91–105, 97 (“As defined currently, these 
rules add unnecessary cost and complexity to the securitization market and apply broadly 
across securitized product classes, irrespective of their differences and performance history.”). 
 43. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
115-174, 132 Stat. 1296, 1296 (2018) (“An act to promote economic growth, provide tailored 
regulatory relief, and enhance consumer protections, and for other purposes.”). 
 44. Id.; Sylvan Lane, Trump Signs Dodd-Frank Rollback, THE HILL (May 24, 2018, 12:32 
PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/389212-trump-signs-dodd-frank-rollback (“Trump 
had pledged to ‘dismantle’ Dodd-Frank, a law long targeted by Republicans, and touted the 
bill he signed as the first step in that process.”). 
 45. See Catie Edmondson & Jasmine C. Lee, Meet the New Freshmen in Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/28/us/politics/congress-
freshman-class.html (discussing political demographics of the 116th Congress). 
 46. See Rappeport & Flitter, supra note 39 (noting that at least one of the Dodd-Frank 
rollbacks was a “demonstration of bipartisanship”). 
 47. See DECHERT, LLP, FINANCIAL REGULATION REFORM TRACKER:  ROLLBACK OF 
DODD-FRANK (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/hot-topic/financial-regu-
lation-reform-tracker/rollback-of-dodd-frank.html (noting recent congressional and regula-
tory actions relating to Dodd-Frank that directly impact securitization transactions, including 
expansion of current risk-retention exemptions and whether five-year holding period for third-
party purchasers and sponsors should be decreased). 
 48. See infra Part IV. 
2019] CMBS RISK RETENTION 301 
Frank.  Part II provides a brief background on securitization and CMBS.49  
Part III discusses Dodd-Frank and the regulations subsequently promul-
gated thereunder that affect securitization transactions, particularly 
CMBS.50  Part IV highlights key differentiations between CMBS and 
other ABS transactions, as well as their respective roles in the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis.51  Part V discusses Executive Order 13772 and the Treas-
ury’s subsequent report concerning Dodd-Frank’s effect on securitiza-
tion.52  Part VI suggests that the Dodd-Frank reform efforts should turn 
to the deregulation of CMBS and recommends alternatives to the current 
risk-retention requirement for CMBS.53  Part VII concludes by reiterating 
the importance of securitization and why CMBS should see deregula-
tion.54   
II.  BACKGROUND ON SECURITIZATION AND CMBS 
Securitization,55 which allows the owner of a cash-producing as-
set to immediately realize the asset’s value, first arose in the early 1970s 
and quickly became a major part of the modern financial industry.56  
Since its inception, the securitization market has continually increased 
“its importance as a financing vehicle for a variety of asset classes,”57 
including commercial mortgages58 beginning in the early 1990s.59  Secu-
ritization, particularly CMBS, remains an essential part of the financial 
 
 49. See infra Part II. 
 50. See infra Part III. 
 51. See infra Part IV. 
 52. See infra Part V. 
 53. See infra Part VI. 
 54. See infra Part VII. 
 55. Securitization is also known as “structured finance.”  Structured Financing Tech-
niques, 50 BUS. LAW. 528, 531–32 (1995) [hereinafter Structured Financing Techniques] 
(“The process of issuing securities backed by assets in structured financing is sometimes 
called ‘securitization’ because assets are, in a sense, turned into securities—they are mone-
tized, not through traditional secured borrowings or factoring, but through the issuance of 
asset-backed securities.”). 
 56. Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 1; TREASURY REPORT, supra note 39, at 
91.  However, “[t]he practice of securitizing cash flows through the issuance of associated 
debt obligations has existed as a successful financing tool for centuries.”  TREASURY REPORT, 
supra note 39, at 91. 
 57. Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 67. 
 58. Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 67. 
 59. Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 68; Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 
6, at 1. 
302 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
industry of the twenty-first century, even in the wake of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis.60 
A.       Defining Securitization 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of securiti-
zation, and even some disagreement about what necessarily must be in-
cluded to constitute an acceptable definition,61 securitization can be un-
derstood as the process of converting assets into negotiable securities, 
transferable on a secondary market,62 that generate cash flow for inves-
tors.63  Although some assets are more commonly securitized than oth-
ers64 (such as residential and commercial mortgages, business loans, 
 
 60. See infra Part IV; see, e.g., ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND ESTATES 399–400 (Wolters Kluwer et al. eds., 15th ed. 2017) (stating that ABS industry 
was worth greater than $1 trillion in 2016); cf. Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 68–
69 (stating that roughly one-third of the outstanding commercial mortgages were financed 
through CMBS in 2007 and still approximately one fifth in 2015).   
 61. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, What Is Securitization?  And For What Purpose?, 85 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1283 (2012) (analyzing the necessary components of a “workable” definition 
of securitization, and providing a proposed definition with those components, while critiquing 
past attempts at defining securitization).   
 62. A “secondary market” is a “securities market in which previously issued securities 
are traded among investors.”  Secondary Market, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
Thus, a “secondary mortgage market” is a securities market in which mortgage-backed secu-
rities are traded between investors who are neither the issuers of those securities nor the initial 
investors who purchased the securities directly from the issuer.  See Overview of CMBS, supra 
note 1, at 288 n.7 (discussing secondary markets). 
 63. Compare Securitize, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“To convert (assets) 
into negotiable securities for resale in the financial market, allowing the issuing financial in-
stitution to remove assets from its books, and thereby improve its capital ratio and liquidity, 
and to make new loans with the security proceeds if it so chooses.”), and LYNN M. LOPUCKI, 
ELIZABETH WARREN & ROBERT M. LAWLESS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS:  A SYSTEMS 
APPROACH 32 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., Wolters Kluwer 8th ed. 2016) (“To ‘securitize’ 
an asset is to divide ownership of its value into large numbers of identical shares.”), with Am. 
Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 1 (“Securitization is the creation and issuance of debt 
securities, or bonds, whose payments of principal and interest derive from cash flows gener-
ated by separate pools of assets.”), and Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 288–89 (“Secu-
ritization is the process by which financial assets that generate cash flow, such as home mort-
gages, automobile loans, credit card receivables, tax liens, or [CRE] loans, are converted into 
securities in order to gain access to the capital markets.  Securitization takes illiquid assets 
and transforms them into marketable securities.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 64. See LOPUCKI, WARREN & LAWLESS, supra note 63, at 32 (stating that mortgages and 
accounts are the most commonly securitized assets). 
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automobile loans, credit card receivables, and tax liens),65 it is worth not-
ing that “any kind of asset can be securitized.”66   
There are numerous forms of securitization transactions, most of 
which (if not all), fall into the broad category of ABS.67  For example, 
among the different forms of securitization transactions that are consid-
ered ABS, there are collateralized loan obligations (“CLO”),68 CMBS, 
RMBS, and CDOs.69  Regardless of the form of a particular securitization 
transaction, these core aspects remain relatively constant. 
B.         The Structure and Mechanics of CMBS and Other Securitization 
Transactions 
As is the case with any securitization transaction, there are nu-
merous players involved in CMBS transactions,70 which often include the 
(a) borrowers, (b) originator71 (lender), (c) depositor,72 (d) issuer73 
 
 65. See Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 288 (listing “home mortgages, automobile 
loans, credit card receivables, tax liens, [and] commercial real estate loans” as assets that can 
be securitized). 
 66. LOPUCKI, WARREN & LAWLESS, supra note 63, at 32. 
 67. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) § 941, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (2012) (defining ABS expansively); see also infra Part III. 
 68. See Collateralized Loan Obligation – CLO, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/c/clo.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2018) (“A collateralized loan obligation 
. . . is a security backed by a pool of debt, often low-rated corporate loans.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 941(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (defining ABS).   
 70. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 39, at 91. 
 71. An “originator” is “a person who: (1) [t]hrough an extension of credit or otherwise, 
creates an asset that collateralizes an [ABS]; and (2) [s]ells the asset directly or indirectly to 
a securitizer or issuing entity.  12 C.F.R. § 244.2 (2018). 
 72. In a securitization transaction, a “depositor” is:  
 
(1) [t]he person that receives or purchases and transfers or sells the secu-
ritized assets to the issuing entity; (2) [t]he sponsor, in the case of a secu-
ritization transaction where there is not an intermediate transfer of assets 
from the sponsor to the issuing entity; or (3) [t]he person that receives or 
purchases and transfers or sells the securitized assets to the issuing entity 
in the case of a securitization transaction where the person transferring or 
selling the securitized assets directly to the issuing entity is itself a trust.   
 
Id.   
 73. An “issuer” or “issuing entity” is, “with respect to a securitization transaction, the 
trust or other entity: (1) [t]hat owns or holds the pool of assets to be securitized; and (2) [i]n 
whose name the [ABS] are issued.”  Id.  An “issuer” may also be referred to as a “securitizer.”  
Dodd-Frank § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11; see also infra note 77 (defining securitizer). 
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(special purpose vehicle (“SPV”)),74 (e) underwriters,75 and (f) inves-
tors.76  Although some of these parties can—and frequently do—take on 
multiple roles in the securitization process, the process is more easily bro-
ken down when each party is viewed as only playing one role.  Neverthe-
less, it is worth noting that the “securitizer”77 (generally the “sponsor”),78 
which is perhaps the most heavily regulated player under Dodd-Frank’s 
ABS regulations,79 may be the originator, depositor, and, through a SPV, 
the issuer.   
The CMBS process may proceed in the following chronological 
order.80  First, borrowers (who are either owners or purchasers of CRE) 
take out mortgages secured by the CRE itself.81  Next, the originator con-
veys the mortgage notes that are to be securitized to a depositor, where 
the mortgages are pooled together.82  Then, the depositor sells the pool(s) 
of mortgages to a SPV.83  When the depositor sells the pool(s) of mort-
gages to the SPV, it is important that the transfer of these mortgages con-
stitutes a “true sale,”84 as opposed to a mere transfer of a security 
 
 74. A special purpose vehicle (“SPV”), sometimes also referred to as a special purpose 
entity (“SPE”), is a legal entity (often a trust) created for the purpose of the securitization 
transaction, which is entirely separate from the originator and capable of providing limited 
liability.  LOPUCKI, WARREN & LAWLESS, supra note 63, at 32.   
 75. Underwriters, which are generally investment banks, serve as intermediaries between 
the SPV, as issuer of the securities, and the investors.  Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 
6, at 5.  
 76. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at app. 1 (“CMBS Structure”). 
 77. The term “securitizer” can refer to “either: (1) [t]he depositor of the [ABS] (if the 
depositor is not the sponsor); or (2) [t]he sponsor of the [ABS].”  12 C.F.R. § 244.2; see also 
infra note 78 (defining sponsor). 
 78. A “sponsor” is “a person who organizes and initiates a securitization transaction by 
selling or transferring assets, either directly or indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the 
issuing entity.”  § 244.2. 
 79. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 780-11 (2012) (stating risk-retention requirement applies to 
securitizers (which includes sponsors) and originators). 
 80. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at app. 1 (“CMBS Structure”). 
 81. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at app. 1 (“CMBS Structure”). 
 82. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at app. 1 (“CMBS Structure”). 
 83. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at app. 1 (“CMBS Structure”). 
 84. A “true sale” legally separates the assets that are sold from the originator (seller).  
Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 4 (“The proceeds of the securities are remitted to 
the originator as the purchase price for the assets.  If the asset transfer is not a ‘true sale,’ the 
investors are vulnerable to claims against the originator of the assets.”). 
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interest.85  Then, the SPV divides the pool(s) into different tranches,86 
which are based on the underlying loan quality and priority level.87  Next, 
from the tranches, the SPV issues certificates (securities) to the depositor, 
which subsequently sells the certificates to underwriters and/or initial 
purchasers.88  The underwriters and/or initial purchasers pay the depositor 
for the certificates directly, and the depositor pays the originator the pur-
chase price for the mortgage loans.89  Finally, the underwriters and/or in-
itial purchasers may sell the certificates to investors,90 at which point the 
CMBS have entered into the secondary mortgage market.91   
C.        The Importance of CMBS in CRE Financing 
Whenever a CRE project is in need of obtaining financing, the 
CRE borrower will want to “consider[] whether [or not] to borrow from 
a lender who will securitize the [CRE] loan.”92  In making its decision, 
 
 85. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 311–12; accord Structured Financing Tech-
niques, supra note 55, at 533. 
 86. “Tranche” stems from the French word “slice.”  Tranche, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014).  In securities law, a tranche refers to “[a] bond issue derived from pooling of 
similar debt obligations.”  Id. 
 87. LOPUCKI, WARREN & LAWLESS, supra note 63, at 32 (“A tranche is a priority level.  
If the account debtors’ payments are insufficient to pay all of the certificates, the SPV pays 
them to the first tranche, pro rata in proportion to their shares, until the first tranche certificates 
are paid in full.  The SPV pays the excess, if any, to the second tranche in the same manner.  
The SPV repeats the process for each successive tranche, until the money is exhausted.”).  
Furthermore, tranches are generally   
 
divided into senior, mezzanine, and junior classes.  Senior and mezzanine 
classes typically carry an investment-grade rating by a nationally recog-
nized statistical rating organization (NRSRO), with the senior bond often 
carrying a AAA rating.  The junior, or subordinate, class is typically un-
rated.  Principal and interest payments from the underlying collateral ‘wa-
terfall’ down the capital structure of the SPV’s balance sheet, while losses 
associated with the default of the underlying assets are absorbed begin-
ning with the most junior, or first-loss, classes.  More senior classes typ-
ically do not bear credit-related cash shortfalls until the credit enhance-
ment from subordinate classes is exhausted. 
 
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 39, at 92. 
 88. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at app. 1 (“CMBS Structure”). 
 89. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at app. 1 (“CMBS Structure”). 
 90. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at app. 1 (“CMBS Structure”). 
 91. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 288 n.7. 
 92. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 297. 
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the CRE “borrower must weigh the relative benefits of this type of bor-
rowing against more traditional [CRE] financing.”93   
Securitization provides various benefits to the parties involved, 
regardless of whether a party’s role is large or small.94  For borrowers, 
securitization lowers borrowing costs95 and provides greater access to in-
vestment capital96 and financing97 through the U.S. capital markets, 
which may otherwise be unavailable.98  For this reason, CMBS is partic-
ularly important in smaller, more rural communities.99  Without securiti-
zation, the availability of financing to CRE borrowers in these communi-
ties would be limited by the local institutions’ available capital, which in 
turn would increase borrowing costs.100  Additionally, most CRE loans 
are nonrecourse,101 which is substantially beneficial to CRE borrowers in 
the event of default.102 
Securitization also enables loan originators to immediately real-
ize the value of their loans, thereby increasing available capital for new 
loans, which in turn, increases their overall return on investment.103  It 
also provides the issuers of the CMBS with flexibility “by allowing the 
inclusion of assets that have different cash flow and maturity character-
istics.”104   
 
 93. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 297. 
 94. See, e.g., Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U. L. REV. 
405, 464 (2002) (“Securitization has . . . revolutionized the way in which real estate is . . . 
acquired and financed. . . .”). 
 95. Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 4.  
 96. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 289, 297. 
 97. Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 4. 
 98. Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 6. 
 99. Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 6. 
 100. See Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 7 (“Securitization . . . aids in the ge-
ographic dispersion of capital to areas that may otherwise be deprived of credit options.  Tra-
ditionally, depository institutions have provided credit in the areas where they accepted de-
posits.  By securitizing loans, however, the lender generates capital for new loans that may 
come from a different location.  This linkage to the capital markets broadens the range of 
regions where depository institutions obtain capital to provide credit.”). 
 101. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Commercial Real Estate Bubble, 3 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 83, 89 (2013).  A “nonrecourse loan” is “[a] secured loan that allows the lender 
to attach only the collateral, not the borrower’s personal assets,” if the borrower defaults.  
Nonrecourse Loan, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 102. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 297 n.96.  But cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(i), 
(b) (2018) (discussing income taxation liability for discharged debt obligations stemming 
from nonrecourse loans).   
 103. Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 6–7; Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 
289. 
 104. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 289.   
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In addition to the more lucrative benefits, securitization also low-
ers some of the risk that is inherent in any lending transaction.105  By 
providing access to financing through capital markets, securitization al-
lows geographical diversification among the securitized assets, as well as 
diversification among property types.106  For example, if a disaster (such 
as a hurricane) strikes a particular geographical region and causes numer-
ous borrowers—whose loans are part of a particular CMBS conduit—to 
default, such disaster would not be entirely detrimental to the CMBS con-
duit if it were also made up of loans secured by CRE in geographical 
areas immune to that particular disaster.107  Likewise, diversification 
among property type would protect investors and originators in the event 
that a particular industry or property type, such as grocery stores or hotels, 
experienced oversaturation and a subsequent rise in defaults.108   
Furthermore, through segregation of the securitized assets from 
the originating entity, securitization reduces the level of investor risk in 
the event the loan originator files bankruptcy.109  This is because the orig-
inator’s assets will not include the loans that were sold to the SPV in a 
true sale and subsequently securitized.110  Similarly, because CMBS are 
made up of CRE loans, CMBS will often provide for decreased bank-
ruptcy risk of the borrower as well.111  This is because a CRE borrower 
is often a single-purpose entity112 (as is sometimes required to obtain a 
CRE loan), formed for the sole purpose of borrowing money from the 
lender, whose sole asset is the CRE that secures the loan and whose sole 
creditor is the lender.113  This “bankruptcy remoteness”114 benefits origi-
nators, issuers, and investors alike.115   
 
 105. See Brown, supra note 12, at 138 (discussing benefits of diversification among prop-
erty types and geographical locations). 
 106. Brown, supra note 12, at 138.  This diversification lessens the risks inherently asso-
ciated with real estate lending.  Brown, supra note 12, at 138. 
 107. Brown, supra note 12, at 138. 
 108. Brown, supra note 12, at 138. 
 109. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 311. 
 110. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 311. 
 111. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 298; Levitin & Wachter, supra note 101, at 89. 
 112. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 101, at 89.  A “single-purpose entity” can be any 
entity, capable of providing limited liability, which “holds title to real property and owes 
money to a lender as a result of a mortgage on the property, but which has no other assets or 
liabilities.”  Single-Purpose Entity, FREE DICTIONARY, https://financial-dictionary.thefreedic-
tionary.com/single-purpose+entity (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). 
 113. Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 298. 
 114. See Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 289 (discussing importance of “bankruptcy 
remoteness” in securitization transactions). 
 115. Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 7.   
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III.  THE NEW REGULATIONS:  RISK RETENTION  
In 2010, when Congress passed Dodd-Frank in response to the 
2008 financial crisis,116 it created a new, extraordinarily powerful regula-
tory framework.117  Dodd-Frank included a number of new regulations 
directly affecting CMBS and other securitization transactions, including 
increased disclosure requirements,118 a 5% credit risk-retention require-
ment,119 rating agency reform,120 and capital requirements.121  The risk-
retention requirement became effective for CMBS as of December 24, 
2016.122  
In its attempt to “improve[] . . . the [ABS] process,”123 Dodd-
Frank failed to make adequate differentiations between the various secu-
ritization transactions.124  Instead of making the necessary distinctions, 
Dodd-Frank broadly defined “ABS”—those securitization transactions to 
which the new regulations apply—as follows: 
 
[An asset-backed security (“ABS”) is] a fixed income or 
other security collateralized by any type of self-
 
 116. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (“To promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big 
to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abu-
sive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”). 
 117. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 39 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s breadth). 
 118. See Dodd-Frank § 942(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c) (requiring “detailed periodic asset-level 
disclosures” (quoting Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 87)); § 945, 12 U.S.C. § 
77g(d) (requiring “disclosure detailing an issuer’s pre-securitization asset review process” 
(quoting Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, 87)); § 943, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (requiring 
“disclosure of loan repurchase requests” and “a summary to be provided by the rating agencies 
describing how the representations, warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in a particular 
deal differ from other similar issuances” (quoting Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 
87)). 
 119. Dodd-Frank § 941, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b). 
 120. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank tit. IX, subtit. D, 124 Stat. 1872–90 (“Subtitle C—Improve-
ments to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies”); Dodd-Frank § 943, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 
(2012) (requiring rating agencies to include report of the “representations, warranties, and 
enforcement mechanisms available to investors; and how they differ from the representations, 
warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar securities . . .” which is to 
accompany any credit rating of ABS). 
 121. Dodd-Frank § 171(b)(7)(B)(i), 124 Stat. at 1438. 
 122. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77602 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
 123. Dodd-Frank tit. IX, subtit. D, 124 Stat. at 1890–98 (“Subtitle D—Improvements to 
the [ABS] Process”). 
 124. Brown, supra note 12, at 114; accord Morgan, supra note 26, at 364; see also supra 
note 26 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s failure to distinguish between various ABS). 
2019] CMBS RISK RETENTION 309 
liquidating financial asset (including a loan, a lease, a 
mortgage, or a secured or unsecured receivable) that al-
lows the holder of the security to receive payments that 
depend primarily on cash flow from the asset, includ-
ing[:] (i) a collateralized mortgage obligation; (ii) a col-
lateralized debt obligation; (iii) a collateralized bond ob-
ligation; (iv) a collateralized debt obligation of asset-
backed securities; (v) a collateralized debt obligation of 
collateralized debt obligations; and (vi) a security that the 
[Securities and Exchange] Commission [(“SEC”)], by 
rule, determines to be an asset-backed security for pur-
poses of this section. . . .125   
 
The breadth of this definition captures every imaginable ABS transaction: 
as it was likely intended to do.  However, such definition placed all ABS 
into the same category for purposes of regulation, and, absent an exemp-
tion,126 left CMBS vulnerable to overly-expansive and unnecessary reg-
ulation127—such as those regulations currently in place, which were en-
acted under the umbrella of authority created by Dodd-Frank.128   
A.       The Risk-Retention Requirement129 
While Dodd-Frank’s regulatory grasp extends to vast areas of the 
modern U.S. financial system, one of its main targets was securitization 
transactions,130 particularly those backed by home mortgages.131  Of all 
 
 125. Dodd-Frank § 941(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a). 
 126. Dodd-Frank permits the SEC and the “Federal banking agencies” to adopt “exemp-
tions, exceptions, or adjustments” to the Dodd-Frank regulations, including those that would 
apply to the risk-retention requirement.  Dodd-Frank § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 127. See Epstein, supra note 24, at 39 (alluding to the likelihood of exponential expansion 
of regulations following passage of Dodd-Frank because of overly-broad rulemaking power 
it disseminates to regulatory agencies).   
 128. See infra Part V. 
 129. While each of these new regulations (i.e., the disclosure requirements, capital require-
ments, rating agency reforms, and risk-retention requirement) are extremely significant in that 
they impact the CMBS industry, and each should receive similar scrutiny in the spirit of po-
tential deregulation, this Note focuses primarily on the risk-retention requirement. 
 130. See Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 86 (“While sweeping in scope, Dodd-
Frank focused on securitization as the target of legislative and regulatory attention.”). 
 131. See Morgan, supra note 26, at 364 (“The securitization of residential mortgage-
backed assets is generally cited as the catalyst of the subprime mortgage crisis and the subse-
quent collapse of the financial markets.”). 
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the Dodd-Frank regulations that affect securitization transactions, the 
most significant piece of securitization reform is unquestionably the risk-
retention (i.e., “skin-in-the-game”)132 requirement,133 which Barney 
Frank, co-author of the Dodd-Frank legislation, called “the single most 
important part of the bill.”134  Indeed, six regulatory agencies are involved 
with the risk-retention requirement.135   
The primary purpose of the risk-retention requirement is to ensure 
alignment of the various interests in ABS transactions, many of which are 
inherently competitive with one another under the traditional securitiza-
tion practice, “originate-to-sell.”136  In contrast to the traditional lending 
practice of “originate-to-hold,” where the loan originator keeps the loans 
on its books throughout the entire amortization period of the loan,137 un-
der the originate-to-sell model, the underlying loans are originated for the 
sole purpose of selling the loans to a securitization vehicle, without any 
originator or issuer recourse in the event the underlying loans experience 
default.138  In essence, the risk-retention requirement has reinserted an 
element of the originate-to-hold model back into the originate-to-sell 
 
 132. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77719 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
 133. Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 86 (“The risk retention component, or ‘skin 
in the game’ provisions, of Dodd-Frank make up the law’s most significant securitization 
reform.”). 
 134. Norris, supra note 20 (“ ’To me,’ said Barney Frank, the former chairman of the 
House Financial Services Committee and co-author of the law, ‘the single most important part 
of the [Dodd-Frank] bill was risk retention.’ ”). 
 135. Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 86–87; see, e.g., Credit Risk Retention, 79 
Fed. Reg. at 77602 (stating that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury 
(“OCC”), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Board”), Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (“FDIC”), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), and Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) jointly adopted the final rule for credit risk retention). 
 136. Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 87; Schwarcz, supra note 18, at 118–19 
(stating that a “moral hazard” resulted from the securitization practice of “originate-to-dis-
tribute”).   
 137. Prior to the introduction of securitization, lenders would hold mortgage notes 
throughout their entire amortization periods (e.g., thirty years for a thirty-year mortgage, or 
fifteen years for a fifteen-year mortgage).  Am. Securitization Forum, supra note 6, at 7–8.  
This can be referred to as the “originate-to-hold” model.  Ann Hambly, CMBS Risk Retention 
101, COM. OBSERVER (Jan. 4, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://www.commer-
cialobserver.com/2017/01/cmbs-risk-retention-101/#.W5LoT1j70Gk.email. 
 138. See Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that securitization transactions 
were not heavily regulated prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank after the 2008 financial crisis). 
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model139 by requiring sponsors to retain 5% of the total credit risk140 of 
the underlying mortgages in a CMBS.141   
B.       The Risk-Retention Options Available for CMBS 
In accordance with Dodd-Frank,142 the administrative agencies 
tasked with enacting new ABS regulations have made different risk-re-
tention methods available for sponsors of securitization transactions.143   
1. The Three Standard Risk Retention Structures 
In general, there are three risk-retention structures from which 
sponsors may choose to satisfy the risk-retention requirement: (1) a ver-
tical slice, (2) a horizontal slice, or (3) a combination of a vertical and 
horizontal slice—known as an “L-shaped” slice.144  Each of these meth-
ods are available to all ABS. 
 
 139. See Hambly, supra note 137 (“[Traditionally, an owner of CRE] went to the local 
bank and got a loan.  Back then, banks funded loans through the traditional ‘originate to hold’ 
concept, meaning if there was loss on the loan, the bank would suffer the loss. . . .  In this 
model, banks had incentive to originate high-quality loans.”). 
 140. “Credit risk” is defined as  
 
(1) [t]he risk of loss that could result from the failure of the borrower in 
the case of a securitized asset, or the issuing entity in the case of an ABS 
interest in the issuing entity, to make required payments of principal or 
interest on the asset or ABS interest on a timely basis; (2) [t]he risk of 
loss that could result from bankruptcy, insolvency, or a similar proceed-
ing with respect to the borrower or issuing entity, as appropriate; or (3) 
[t]he effect that significant changes in the underlying credit quality of the 
asset or ABS interest may have on the market value of the asset or ABS 
interest. 
 
12 C.F.R. § 244.2 (2018). 
 141. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(E) (2012) (requiring securitizers to retain 5% of credit risk in 
ABS transactions). 
 142. See id. (permitting the six regulatory agencies, authorized to do so under Dodd-Frank, 
to establish alternatives to general 5% risk-retention requirement). 
 143. See 12 C.F.R. § 244.4(a) (providing that sponsors of securitization transaction can 
accomplish risk-retention requirement through retaining an “eligible vertical interest,” an “el-
igible horizontal residual interest,” or “combination thereof”—referred to as an L-shaped in-
terest). 
 144. Id.   
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In the vertical structure, the sponsor retains an “eligible vertical 
interest,”145 or, in other words, an interest in each tranche in the transac-
tion, which amounts to 5% of the aggregate risk in the CMBS.146  Vertical 
risk retention offers perhaps the cheapest method for sponsors to meet the 
risk-retention requirement.147  Additionally, this method best ensures the 
sponsor’s interests are aligned with those of investors since the sponsor 
has skin in the game (i.e., risk exposure) in each tranche of the transac-
tion.148   
In the horizontal structure, the sponsor retains an “eligible hori-
zontal residual interest,”149 i.e., an interest in the lowest tranche (or 
tranches) in the transaction, which amounts to 5% of the aggregate risk 
in the CMBS.150  Horizontal risk retention, because it requires the sponsor 
to retain an interest in the riskiest part of the transaction, burdens the 
sponsor with more credit exposure than the other two risk-retention meth-
ods; however, it does provide some benefits, such as the possibility of 
earning a higher rate of return than any other tranche.151  Additionally, 
 
 145. Id.  “Eligible vertical interest” refers to “a single vertical security or an interest in 
each class of ABS interests in the issuing entity issued as part of the securitization transaction 
that constitutes the same proportion of each such class.”  Id. § 244.2. 
 146. Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at 2; Catherine Liu & Katrina Estrella, 2018:  Year 
of Transition for CMBS Industry, REBUSINESS ONLINE (Feb. 27, 2018), http://rebusi-
nessonline.com/2018-year-of-transition-for-cmbs-industry/. 
 147. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77720 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
 148. Id. 
 149. 12 C.F.R. § 244.4.  “Eligible horizontal residual interest” refers to 
 
an ABS interest in the issuing entity:  (1) That is an interest in a single 
class or multiple classes in the issuing entity, provided that each interest 
meets, individually or in the aggregate, all of the requirements of this def-
inition; (2) [w]ith respect to which, on any payment date or allocation 
date on which the issuing entity has insufficient funds to satisfy its obli-
gation to pay all contractual interest or principal due, any resulting short-
fall will reduce amounts payable to the eligible horizontal residual interest 
prior to any reduction in the amounts payable to any other ABS interest, 
whether through loss allocation, operation of the priority of payments, or 
any other governing contractual provision (until the amount of such ABS 
interest is reduced to zero); and (3) [t]hat, with the exception of any non-
economic [real estate mortgage investment conduit (“REMIC”)] residual 
interest, has the most subordinated claim to payments of both principal 
and interest by the issuing entity. 
 
 Id. § 244.2. 
 150. See id. (defining eligible horizontal residual interest); accord Sargent & Jewesson, 
supra note 7, at 2; Liu & Estrella, supra note 146. 
 151. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77719–20. 
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under the horizontal approach, the sponsor can choose to satisfy the risk-
retention requirement by “establish[ing] and fund[ing], in cash, an eligi-
ble horizontal cash reserve account in the amount equal to the fair value 
of such eligible horizontal residual interest or part thereof, provided that 
the account meets [certain] . . . conditions[,]” in lieu of retaining an actual 
horizontal interest in the CMBS.152   
The L-shaped (hybrid) structure allows the sponsor to meet the 
risk-retention requirement by combining the horizontal and vertical struc-
tures.153  Under this approach, the sponsor may elect to retain whatever 
percentage of risk the sponsor prefers in a vertical and horizontal inter-
est—so long as the risk retained equals 5% of the aggregate risk in the 
CMBS.154  Under the current regulations, the L-shaped structure is per-
haps the most attractive risk-retention option because its flexibility allows 
sponsors to tailor their risk-retention method to fit their specific needs.155 
2. Allocation of Risk Retention to the Originator 
In choosing to satisfy the risk-retention requirement through the 
vertical, horizontal (including the cash reserve account alternative), or L-
shaped structures, a sponsor may further elect to offset the required risk-
retention percentage by allocating some of the burden to the originator.156  
The method in which this risk allocation to the originator is accomplished 
is subject to a number of requirements, including that (a) the originator’s 
retained interest is retained and held “in the same manner and proportion 
(as between horizontal and vertical interests) as the sponsor,”157 (b) the 
originator’s retained interest does not exceed a certain amount,158 (c) the 
originator’s retained interest is at least 20% of the aggregate risk amount 
otherwise required to be retained by the sponsor,159 and (d) the amount 
for which the originator purchases the eligible interests from the sponsor 
“is equal, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, to the amount by which the 
 
 152. 12 C.F.R. § 244.4(b). 
 153. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77720.  For example, under the L-shaped ap-
proach, a sponsor could retain 2% in a vertical interest and 3% in a horizontal interest to 
satisfy the risk-retention requirement.  Id.  
 154. Id.; accord § 244.4; Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at 2. 
 155. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77720–21. 
 156. § 244.11(a). 
 157. Id. § 244.11(a)(1)(i). 
 158. Id. § 244.11(a)(1)(ii). 
 159. Id. § 244.11(a)(1)(iii). 
314 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
sponsor’s required risk retention is reduced.”160  However, the burden re-
mains on the sponsor to provide any required disclosures to necessary 
parties,161 as well as to ensure that the originator complies and remains in 
compliance with all relevant regulations and requirements,162 including 
the hedging and transfer restrictions that the sponsor itself is subject to.163 
3. CMBS Option: Utilization of the “B-Piece” Construct 
For CMBS, there is yet another method in which the sponsor can 
satisfy the risk-retention requirement under the current regulations: the 
utilization of “B-piece” buyers164 as third-party purchasers (“TPP”) of the 
horizontal residual interest.165  This approach follows a risk-shifting prac-
tice, which was already in existence and utilized throughout the CMBS 
industry prior to Dodd-Frank,166 as a means of satisfying the sponsor’s 
risk-retention obligation.167  B-piece buyers are generally highly experi-
enced real estate investors who specialize in high-risk/high-reward real 
estate investments.168  Unlike other ABS investors, B-piece investors use 
their vast, specialized knowledge about real estate markets and the under-
lying mortgages in any given CMBS, “to conduct extensive due dili-
gence.”169  Indeed, B-piece investors may insist on removal of some of 
the riskiest mortgages before consummation of the deal.170  As a result, 
 
 160. Id. § 244.11(a)(1)(iv). 
 161. Id. § 244.11(a)(2). 
 162. Id. § 244.11(b). 
 163. Id. § 244.11(a)(3). 
 164. “B-piece” refers to “below-investment grade CMBS tranches.”  Kronovet & van 
Heerden, supra note 8, at 87.  B-piece buyers are investors in the CMBS industry who “buy 
the lowest, riskiest tranches in each CMBS transaction with commiserate risk-based yields 
and are awarded with some control over the disposition of the defaulted loans.”  Kronovet & 
van Heerden, supra note 8, at 87 n.15.  Additionally, B-piece buyers often remove loans from 
CMBS pools during the due diligence period if they find them to be objectionable to the pool.  
Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 87 n.15.  A B-piece buyer’s insistence on the re-
moval of a loan during due diligence (called a “kickout”) is very expensive for CMBS spon-
sors because in such a case, the sponsor is stuck holding that loan itself.  Levitin & Wachter, 
supra note 101, at 98–99.  Since B-piece buyers are investors, this Note uses the terms “B-
piece buyer” and “B-piece investor” interchangeably.   
 165. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77723 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
 166. Id. at 77724; Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 87. 
 167. 12 C.F.R. § 244.7(b); Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at 2; Kronovet & van 
Heerden, supra note 8, at 87; Liu & Estrella, supra note 146. 
 168. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77724. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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B-piece investors are frequently more knowledgeable about the underly-
ing mortgages than the other parties in CMBS transactions.171 
Under this approach, the sponsor can sell its horizontal interest to 
one or two B-piece buyers as TPPs;172 but there cannot be more than two 
TPPs at any given time,173 and if there are two TPPs, the TPPs’ respective 
interests must be pari passu174 with one another.175  The horizontal inter-
est (or combined interests if there are two TPPs) represents the eligible 
horizontal residual interest that the sponsor would have otherwise been 
required to retain.176  Although the sponsor is able to satisfy the risk-re-
tention requirement through the utilization of the B-piece construct, the 
sponsor remains responsible for TPP compliance throughout the life of 
the CMBS, including through later transfers to subsequent TPPs.177  
Thus, the risk retention relief this approach provides the sponsor is mini-
mal. 
The B-piece construct also places limitations on TPPs.  Once a 
TPP purchases a horizontal residual interest from a sponsor, it is required 
to hold that B-piece interest for a five-year term.178  Throughout the entire 
term of the TPP’s ownership of the B-piece interest (whether it is for five 
years or longer), the TPP is subject to compliance with the requirements 
that the sponsor would have been subject to had it retained the interest, 
such as the hedging and transferring restrictions.179  However, once the 
five years are up, the initial TPP is free to sell its B-piece interest to an-
other qualified TPP (if it so chooses), but must notify the sponsor and 
provide the sponsor with the certain information regarding the acquiring 
TPP.180  The subsequent TPP is not required to hold the B-piece interest 
for any particular term, and thus may sell its interest to a different 
 
 171. Id.; accord Morgan, supra note 26, at 379–80. 
 172. 12 C.F.R. § 244.7(b); accord Sargent & Jewesson, supra note 7, at 2. 
 173. 12 C.F.R. § 244.7(b)(1).  The reasoning behind limiting the number of TPPs permit-
ted to share the sponsor’s eligible horizontal residual interest to two was based on the fear that 
too many TPPs would “dilute incentives generated by the risk retention requirement.”  Credit 
Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77725. 
 174. Pari passu is Latin for “by equal step,” i.e., “[p]roportionally . . . equal . . . without 
preference.”  Pari Passu, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 175. 12 C.F.R. § 244.7(b)(1). 
 176. Id. § 244.7(b). 
 177. Id. § 244.7(c); accord Robin Bouchard et al., What Can Be Expected in Structured 
Finance and Securitization for 2018?, 110 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 200, 201 (Feb. 5, 
2018). 
 178. § 244.7(b)(8)(ii)(A). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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qualified TPP at any time.181  But similar to the initial TPP, the subse-
quent transferring TPP must also provide the sponsor with the necessary 
information regarding the successor TPP.182   
In addition, under the CMBS B-piece construct, the current regu-
lations further require that the underlying securitization transaction doc-
uments provide for the appointment of an independent operating advi-
sor,183 who monitors the special servicer,184 as well as provides investors 
with periodic independent reports of its opinion on the special servicer’s 
performance and compliance regarding its duties.185  Additionally, the in-
dependent operating advisor, “among other obligations, has the authority 
to recommend and call a vote for removal of the special servicer under 
certain conditions.”186  The independent operating advisor does not have 
any financial interest in a CMBS transaction over which it monitors, 
“other than [the] fees from its role as operating advisor,”187 and is charged 
with looking out for the interests and benefits “of investors as a collective 
whole.”188  In addition to the other regulations enacted under Dodd-
Frank, this requirement further increases the cost of CMBS transac-
tions.189 
 IV.  DIFFERENTIATING CMBS FROM OTHER FORMS OF SECURITIZATION 
Dodd-Frank has consistently faced criticism for its failure to 
properly separate the problematic ABS transactions from the other 
 
 181. Id. § 244.7(b)(8)(ii)(C). 
 182. Id. § 244.7(b)(8)(ii)(B). 
 183. Id. § 244.7(b)(6)(v). 
 184. A “servicer” is defined as “any person responsible for the management or collection 
of the securitized assets or making allocations or distributions to holders of the ABS inter-
ests. . . .”  Id. § 244.2.  A “special servicer” is, “with respect to any securitization of [CRE] 
loans, any servicer that, upon the occurrence of one or more specified conditions in the ser-
vicing agreement, has the right to service one or more assets in the transaction.  Id. § 244.7(a).  
“Servicing assets” refers to “rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely 
distribution of proceeds to ABS interest holders and rights or other assets that are related or 
incidental to purchasing or otherwise acquiring and holding the issuing entity’s securitized 
assets.”  Id. § 244.2. 
 185. Id. § 244.7(b)(6)(v)(D). 
 186. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77602, 77724 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; 24 C.F.R. pt. 267); accord 12 C.F.R. §§ 
244.7(b)(6), 244.7(b)(6)(vi)(A). 
 187. 12 C.F.R. § 244.7(b)(6)(i)(B). 
 188. Id. § 244.7(b)(6)(i)(C). 
 189. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77724. 
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securitization transactions.190  Indeed, there are a number of differences 
between RMBS and CMBS, as well as CDOs and CMBS, that are not 
accounted for in Dodd-Frank.191  Although some of the regulations sub-
sequently promulgated under Dodd-Frank have made some distinctions 
between certain securitization transactions, these distinctions similarly 
fail to provide adequate exemptions for CMBS.192   
A.       Comparing RMBS and CMBS: The Underlying Mortgages 
While the list of differences between RMBS and CMBS, and 
CDOs and CMBS, discussed below is by no means exhaustive, it serves 
as illustrative to the fact that not all ABS transactions are the same.  The 
differences described below suggest that CMBS presents less structural 
risks to investors than RMBS, and thus do not warrant the same level of 
regulation as RMBS.193 
1. Loan-to-Value Ratios 
One significant difference between CMBS and RMBS can be 
seen by the loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios of the underlying mortgages:  
the average LTV ratio is significantly higher in RMBS than in CMBS.  
The net benefit of the lower LTV ratios in CMBS is twofold.  First, be-
cause the borrowers have more skin in the game, they are much less likely 
to default.  Second, because a lower LTV ratio provides a greater equity 
cushion, the value of the property must decline a significant amount be-
fore there is a risk to investors.194   
 
 190. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 115–16 (stating that the failures of RMBS led the 
legislators and the general public to believe such failures were present among all ABS, and 
the successes of CMBS were overlooked as a result); accord Morgan, supra note 26, at 364 
(“Dodd-Frank itself fails to adequately differentiate between the [RMBS] and CMBS mar-
kets.”); see also supra notes 26–27 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s failure to adequately distinguish 
CMBS from other ABS). 
 191. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 116 (“[C]ontrary to the majority view in the legal 
commentary, the causes of the RMBS market’s failure are not applicable to the CMBS market 
. . . .  [Because] the product structure of CMBS transactions provides greater investor protec-
tions than RMBS.”). 
 192. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 39, at 91, 95; see also infra Part V. 
 193. Brown, supra note 12, at 16. 
 194. This equity cushion is referred to as the “subordination level,” which “is the maxi-
mum amount of principal loss on the underlying mortgage that can occur without a given 
security suffering any loss.”  Stanton & Wallace, supra note 33, at 177 n.9. 
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The difference in the underlying LTV ratios for RMBS and 
CMBS can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that there are strong 
governmental incentives in helping Americans achieve their dream of 
owning a home.195  For example, Federal Housing Administration 
(“FHA”) loans are mortgages insured by the FHA and allow individuals 
to obtain a mortgage with a down payment of only 3.5%, which results 
in an LTV ratio of 96.5%.196  Additionally, veterans have access to Vet-
eran Administration (“VA”) loans, which have an LTV ratio of 100%.197  
In VA loans, the federal government guarantees lenders payment of at 
least some of the loss that would be incurred in the event of borrower 
default.198  Nevertheless, the ideal LTV ratio for residential mortgages is 
generally eighty percent and below, at which point the borrower is not 
required to purchase private mortgage insurance (“PMI”).199  Unlike 
RMBS, the average LTV ratio for the underlying mortgages in CMBS is 
generally less than 70%, and this was true even during the years leading 
up to the 2008 financial crisis.200 
While these efforts are notable, lowering the lending standards 
bar for residential mortgages can result in an increase in sub-prime lend-
ing,201 which opens the door for higher default rates.202  Given that future 
real estate prices can be extraordinarily unpredictable, the true risk of 
 
 195. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., BLUEPRINT FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM 
(2002), https://archives.hud.gov/initiatives/blueprint/blueprint.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2019) 
(stating that “homeownership” is synonymous with “The American Dream”). 
 196. ZILLOW, What is an FHA Loan? – The Complete Consumer Guide, https://www.zil-
low.com/mortgage-learning/fha-loan/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2019); Justin Pritchard, What is a 
Loan to Value Ratio and How to Calculate It, THE BALANCE (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.the-
balance.com/loan-to-value-ratio-315629; see also Overview of CMBS, supra note 1, at 292 
(discussing how VA and FHA loans are guaranteed by the federal government).   
 197. See, e.g., VETERANS UNITED HOME LOANS, https://www.veteransunited.com/va-
loans/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2019) (advertising that qualified veterans can secure a home mort-
gage without a down payment); see also VETERANS UNITED HOME LOANS, [hereinafter Why 
VA Loans Don’t Require Down Payment], https://www.veteransunited.com/realestate/why-
va-loans-dont-require-a-down-payment/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2019) (stating that VA loans do 
not require a down payment or private mortgage insurance (“PMI”)). 
 198. Why VA Loans Don’t Require Down Payment, supra note 197.   
 199. Pritchard, supra note 196.  Private mortgage insurance (“PMI”) protects the lender 
against borrower default, the risk for which decreases as the borrower pays down the loan and 
builds equity.  Pritchard, supra note 196. 
 200. Stanton & Wallace, supra note 33, at 187. 
 201. “Sub-prime lending” refers to loans made that are below the typical lending stand-
ards.  Brown, supra note 12, at 111 n.23. 
 202. Brown, supra note 12, at 111 (“Market participants and practitioners have generally 
concluded that years of lax lending standards in subprime residential mortgage loan origina-
tion led to increasingly poor loan quality, widespread downgrades of the highest rated classes 
of [RMBS], and substantial losses in the lowest rated classes.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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high LTV ratios is a decline in property value because even a relatively 
small decline could place a borrower “underwater”203 on a loan.  In con-
trast, if a borrower paid a 20% down payment (which would result in an 
LTV ratio of 80%), then the value of the property would have to decline 
20% before the borrower would be underwater and have no incentive to 
continue paying on the mortgage.204   
Unlike residential mortgage lending, which usually permits 
higher LTV ratios,205 commercial mortgage lending generally requires 
lower LTV ratios, which frequently causes the loan to be overcollateral-
ized206 by the CRE that secures the loan.  Overcollateralization of the loan 
serves as an additional equity cushion—which may be nonexistent in 
loans with high LTV ratios—for the lender, should the borrower de-
fault.207 
The lower LTV ratios that are required for commercial mortgages 
make CMBS inherently less susceptible than RMBS to default.208  Be-
cause heightened LTV ratio requirements (i.e., lower LTV ratios) result 
in a significant amount of equity being tied up in the mortgaged CRE, the 
CRE borrower has a strong incentive to avoid default.209  Additionally, 
such equity may even permit the borrower to leverage the equity by tak-
ing out an additional loan to help remain current on the securitized loan.  
Furthermore, even if the borrower does default, there is much less risk 
that the CMBS will experience a loss from the securitized mortgage since 
the underlying commercial mortgage was overcollateralized.  In other 
words, the value of the property will be sufficient to cover the outstanding 
loan, even if the property experienced a slight decrease in value after the 
mortgage loan was made. 
 
 203. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 101, at 89.  If a borrower’s LTV ratio is greater than 
100%, the borrower is said to be “underwater” or “upside down” on the loan.  Levitin & 
Wachter, supra note 101, at 89.  In other words, if more debt is owed on the real estate that 
secures the property than the property is worth the real estate (or borrower) is underwater.  
Levitin & Wachter, supra note 101, at 89. 
 204. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 101, at 89. 
 205. From the perspective of the lender (originator), and generally an investor structured 
financial products, lower LTV ratios are preferred. 
 206. See Overcollateralization, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/o/overcollateralization.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2019) (“Overcollateral-
ization . . . is the process of posting more collateral than is needed to obtain or secure financ-
ing.  Overcollateralization is often used as a method of credit enhancement by lowering the 
creditor’s exposure to default risk.”).   
 207. Id. 
 208. Brown, supra note 12, at 128. 
 209. Brown, supra note 12, at 128. 
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2. Limitations on Prepayment:  Prepayment Prohibitions and 
Prepayment Penalties 
Another difference between the underlying mortgages in CMBS 
and RMBS relates to prepayment limitations in commercial mortgages, 
such as prepayment prohibitions and prepayment penalties.210  Although 
there is a presumption that a lender is under no duty to accept a prepay-
ment (absent a contrary term in the lending agreement),211 prepayment 
penalties in residential mortgage loans have been banned in many states 
after the 2008 financial crisis.212  Unlike their residential counterparts, 
most of the underlying mortgages in CMBS have limitations on prepay-
ment of the loan, through either a complete prepayment prohibition, or at 
least a prepayment penalty.213   
These limits on prepayment of the underlying commercial mort-
gages benefit the integrity of CMBS in a number of ways.214  Most im-
portantly, they help ensure a steady and reliable stream of cash flow from 
the underlying mortgages at the agreed upon interest rate.215  When pre-
payment is not completely prohibited, prepayment penalties encourage 
the borrower to hold the property until loan maturity.216  Even in the case 
of a prepayment, a prepayment penalty lessens the damage to the CMBS 
from the loss of that mortgage’s future payments.217  Additionally, “[t]he 
borrower, in acting to protect its equity investment from the reach of the 
prepayment penalty, has an incentive to finance only properties with a 
stable income flow—precisely those that are less likely to default.”218  
Similarly, “the lender has an incentive to offer financing only to 
 
 210. Brown, supra note 12, at 126–27. 
 211. Brown, supra note 12, at 126 n.108 (“American law has presumed that in the absence 
of a clause permitting prepayment, the lender is under no obligation to accept it.”). 
 212. Brown, supra note 12, at 129.  Whether or not there is an associated penalty, when a 
borrower is permitted to make prepayments, the lender loses a portion of its expected return 
from future payments towards interest.  This may be especially problematic if interest rates 
are going down and the lender is forced to reinvest at a lower market rate of interest.  However, 
CMBS are able to protect against potential loss from prepayments by way of prepayment 
penalties and prepayment prohibitions in the underlying mortgage agreements.  Brown, supra 
note 12, at 126–28. 
 213. Brown, supra note 12, at 126–27. 
 214. Brown, supra note 12, at 126–27.  
 215. Brown, supra note 12, at 126–27. 
 216. Brown, supra note 12, at 127.   
 217. Brown, supra note 12, at 126–27. 
 218. Brown, supra note 12, at 128.   
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properties that will not default and can generate enough rents to meet the 
debt service of the loan.”219   
3. The Number and Size of the Underlying Mortgages 
Another important difference between RMBS and CMBS is the 
size and number of the underlying mortgages in any given pool.220  The 
individual underlying commercial mortgages in CMBS are generally 
much larger in size than those in RMBS.221  For example, in a CMBS 
transaction, the average loan size is well over $1,000,000,222 compared to 
the average loan size in a RMBS transaction, where the typical loan 
would be around $200,000.223  Additionally, unlike RMBS, which often 
hold thousands of residential mortgages,224 CMBS generally contain only 
around 300 mortgages.225  The smaller number of loans in any given 
CMBS transaction makes it relatively easy for investors to perform due 
diligence on the underlying assets; thus, the CMBS structure is generally 
more risk-averse.226   
 
B.         Comparing RMBS and CMBS and Their Respective Roles in the 
2008 Financial Crisis 
Despite “significant downgrades to the mortgage-backed securi-
ties sector”227 following the 2008 financial crisis, “CMBS pricing . . . [re-
mained] resilient.”228  Indeed, between 2007 and 2009, “the performance 
of CMBS was relatively strong compared to RMBS and other [ABS].”229  
Furthermore, during the 2008 financial crisis, commercial mortgage 
loans did not experience a significant increase in rates of default; in fact, 
 
 219. Brown, supra note 12, at 128.   
 220. Brown, supra note 12, at 133.   
 221. Brown, supra note 12, at 133. 
 222. Brown, supra note 12, at 137.   
 223. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 101, at 98.  
 224. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 101, at 98. 
 225. Brown, supra note 12, at 140.   
 226. Brown, supra note 12, at 140; accord Morgan, supra note 26, at 376.  But see Levitin 
& Wachter, supra note 101, at 98 (suggesting that RMBS are better geographically diversified 
than CMBS because of the vast number of loans contained in the former).   
 227. Brown, supra note 12, at 108–09 n.9. 
 228. Brown, supra note 12, at 108–09 n.9. 
 229. Morgan, supra note 26, at 376. 
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“realized defaults were in line with levels observed”230 during the major-
ity of the preceding forty years.231  Similarly, CMBS did not experience 
a decrease in average LTV ratio, during and leading up to the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, despite the rating agencies’ increasingly lax standards during 
that time.232 
C.       Comparing CMBS and CDOs  
There are also numerous differences between CMBS and CDOs 
despite the fact that Dodd-Frank placed both into the category of ABS for 
regulatory purposes.233  One obvious difference is that the underlying as-
sets in CMBS—the commercial mortgages—are always secured by tan-
gible, real property.234  Conversely, CDOs may be made up of a variety 
of assets, tangible and intangible, such as automobile loans, credit card 
receivables, student loan debt, as well as other forms of ABS, including 
RMBS and CMBS.235  For instance, prior to the 2008 financial crisis, 
CDOs sometimes purchased lower-rated bonds from CMBS and other 
securitizations.236  Furthermore, unlike CMBS and RMBS, CDOs are not 
necessarily backed by the cash flow of assets.237  Some CDOs, called 
synthetic CDOs, instead of being backed by cash flows of assets, “are 
 
 230. Stanton & Wallace, supra note 33, at 195 (“[D]uring the [2008 financial] crisis, ex-
pected cumulative default rates were in line with levels observed over almost the whole of the 
40-year period before the crisis, excluding the most recent few years.  [B]oth before and dur-
ing the crisis, the primary shift in the market was the reduction in allowable subordination 
levels by the rating agencies.”). 
 231. Stanton & Wallace, supra note 33, at 195. 
 232. Stanton & Wallace, supra note 33, at 194–95. 
 233. See supra Part III (defining ABS). 
 234. See Brown, supra note 12, at 109 (stating that commercial mortgage loans are the 
underlying assets of CMBS).   
 235. See INVESTOPEDIA, supra note 31 (“A [CDO] is a structured financial product that 
pools together cash flow-generating assets and repackages this asset pool into dis-
crete tranches that can be sold to investors.”).  CDOs can be separated into two categories: 
synthetic CDOs and cash CDOs.  Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOS), FINCAD, [herein-
after FINCAD], https://www.fincad.com/resources/resource-library/wiki/collateralized-debt-
obligations-cdos (last visited Sept. 14, 2018) (“A cash CDO is backed by ‘true’ assets, such 
as bonds or loans. . . .  Synthetic CDOs are not backed by cash flows of assets.  Instead, they 
are linked to their reference entities by credit derivatives, such as [credit default swaps]. . . 
.”). 
 236. Kronovet & van Heerden, supra note 8, at 77–78 (“CDOs . . . assembled and re-se-
curitized lower-rated junior CMBS bonds, credit default swaps, mezzanine debt, and miscel-
laneous assets.”). 
 237. See FINCAD, supra note 235. 
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linked to their reference entities by credit derivatives,238 such as credit 
default swaps.”239  CDOs, both synthetic CDOs and cash CDOs, were 
significant contributors to the 2008 financial crisis.240 
 V.  EXECUTIVE ORDER 13772 AND THE TREASURY’S FINDINGS FOR THE 
NECESSITY OF DODD-FRANK REFORM CONCERNING SECURITIZATION 
On February 3, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 
13772, “Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial Sys-
tem.”241  Specifically, Executive Order 13772 set out to regulate the fi-
nancial industry in a manner consistent with the “Core Principles” of reg-
ulation, which include: (a) preventing bailouts funded by taxpayers, (b) 
“foster[ing] economic growth and vibrant financial markets through more 
rigorous regulatory impact analysis that addresses systemic risk and mar-
ket failures, such as moral hazards and information asymmetry,”242 (c) 
enabling American companies to become competitive with foreign com-
panies in both foreign and domestic markets, (d) “mak[ing] regulation 
efficient, effective, and appropriately tailored,”243 and (e) to “restore 
 
 238. See Credit Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/c/creditderivative.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (“Credit derivatives 
transfer credit risk related to an underlying entity from one party to another without transfer-
ring the actual underlying entity. . . .  There are two main types of derivatives: puts [(an option 
to buy)] and calls [(an option to sell)].”); see also Credit Default Swap, INVESTOPEDIA, 
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event, the seller will pay the buyer the security’s premium as well as all interest payments that 
would have been paid between that time and the security’s maturity date.  A credit default 
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ing market bonds, mortgage-backed securities or corporate bonds.”).  Although credit deriv-
atives are beyond the scope of this Note, they are nevertheless worth mentioning because their 
existence in CDOs is another illustration of the differences between CDOs and CMBS. 
 239. FINCAD, supra note 235.  
 240. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 101, at 107, 108 (“With CMBS, as with RMBS, 
we believe the supply glut resulted in an increase in MBS volume even as risk premia declined 
was caused first and foremost by the emergence of CDOs as major buyers of MBS. . . .  [And, 
f]or RMBS, the CDO enabled the expansion of the [private loan securitization] market, while 
for CMBS, the CDO undermined the traditional underwriting discipline from the B-piece 
market.”).   
 241. Exec. Order No. 13772:  Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial 
System, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965, 9965–66 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
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public accountability within Federal financial regulatory agencies and ra-
tionalize the Federal financial regulatory framework.”244 
Executive Order 13772 further instructed the Secretary of the 
Treasury to conduct a study on the current regulatory state and provide a 
subsequent report “identify[ing] any laws, treaties, regulations, guidance, 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and other Governmental pol-
icies that inhibit Federal regulation of the United States financial system 
in a manner consistent with the Core Principles.”245  
In accordance with Executive Order 13772, the Treasury subse-
quently issued a formal report, which included findings that the post-2008 
financial crisis regulatory “reforms have gone too far toward penalizing 
securitiz[ation transactions].”246  Specifically, with regard to all forms of 
securitization, the Treasury report first stated that “[t]he current regula-
tory regime discourages securitization as a funding vehicle;”247 instead, 
it “encourag[es] lenders to fund loans through more traditional methods 
such as bank deposits.”248  Secondly, the current “[r]egulatory bank cap-
ital requirements treat investment in non-agency securitized instruments 
punitively relative to investments in the disaggregated underlying collat-
eral.”249  Third, the “[r]egulatory liquidity standards unfairly discriminate 
against high-quality securitized product classes compared to other asset 
classes with a similar risk profile.”250  Fourth, the Treasury found that the 
risk-retention requirement imposed on sponsors “adds unnecessary costs 
to securitization as a funding source, thereby inhibiting the prudent ex-
pansion of credit through securitized products.”251  Finally, the report 
stated that the “[e]xpanded disclosure requirements, while an important 
post-crisis reform, are unnecessarily burdensome and could be more ap-
propriately tailored.”252  Additionally, with respect to CMBS in particu-
lar, the Treasury found the transfer requirements for TPPs to be unneces-
sary and discriminatory toward CMBS.253 
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2019] CMBS RISK RETENTION 325 
In line with its findings, the Treasury provided recommendations 
for regulatory reform that would lessen the negative effects Dodd-Frank 
and its regulatory progeny have had on securitization transactions.  Some 
of the most significant of these recommendations relate to risk retention, 
which the Treasury referred to as “an imprecise mechanism by which to 
encourage alignment of interest[s].”254  Nevertheless, the Treasury recog-
nized the benefits of requiring sponsors to have skin-in-the-game.255  
Thus, “[i]nstead of recommending an across-the-board repeal of the [risk-
retention] requirement, [the] Treasury recommend[ed] that federal bank-
ing regulators expand [the current] qualifying risk retention exemptions 
across eligible asset classes based on the unique characteristics of each 
securitized asset class, through notice-and-comment rulemaking.”256  The 
Treasury suggested that the existence of asset-specific disclosure require-
ments ought to be sufficient to merit an exemption where the underlying 
assets are considered to be “qualified.”257 
The Treasury also recommended that the five-year holding period 
for TPPs and sponsors in CMBS transactions should be reviewed.258  
More specifically, the Treasury suggested that the holding period should 
be shortened to whatever regulators determine to be the length of the 
“emergence period” (i.e., the period where the bad loans have either de-
faulted or their presence is at least evident).259 
Finally, instead of continuing to allow six regulatory agencies to 
possess rulemaking authority with regard to the risk-retention require-
ment, the Treasury recommended that “Congress . . . designate a lead 
agency . . . to be responsible for future actions related to the rulemak-
ing.”260 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM OF DODD-FRANK:  CMBS 
DEREGULATION 
Dodd-Frank permitted the regulatory agencies tasked with imple-
menting the new regulations to utilize their rule-making authority to 
“adopt or issue exemptions, exceptions, or adjustments . . . relating to the 
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risk retention requirement and the prohibition on hedging.”261  However, 
there has yet to be a sufficient exemption for CMBS, despite the fact that 
clear and distinct differences exist between CMBS and other forms of 
securitization transactions.262  Although regulations promulgated under 
Dodd-Frank did grant CMBS a slight exception to the risk-retention re-
quirement by permitting the utilization of TPPs,263 such an exception does 
not, by any means, constitute an exemption, partial or total, from the risk-
retention requirement.  Similarly, although the current regulations also 
provide CMBS with the possibility of a complete exemption from the 
risk-retention requirement if certain underwriting standards are met for 
“qualifying” CRE loans,264 the underwriting standards are set so unrea-
sonably high that the effort necessary to meet those standards is imprac-
tical, which thereby defeats the purpose of having the exemption to begin 
with.265  Therefore, given the importance of CMBS in CRE lending, and 
because it is evident that CMBS fall outside the group of securitization 
transactions that were the true troublemakers leading up to the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis,266 CMBS should be released from the burdensome grip of 
the current regulatory regime.   
One possible avenue that the Dodd-Frank reform efforts might 
seek is an across-the-board exemption for CMBS to the risk-retention re-
quirement altogether.  Indeed, there is strong support for the argument 
that what necessitated the risk-retention requirement in the first place—
largely the “moral-hazard”267 that came along with the originate-to-sell 
practice—was not an issue for CMBS given the heightened borrower 
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requirements, as well as the preexisting, extensive nature of CMBS B-
piece buyer due diligence.268  Unlike CDOs, CMBS only contain one type 
of asset: commercial mortgages.  Consequently, CMBS are much less 
complex, thereby making such extensive due diligence feasible.269  Ad-
ditionally, largely because of the level of due diligence by B-piece inves-
tors, CMBS—unlike RMBS—did not experience problems with under-
lying loans stemming from widespread predatory/fraudulent lending 
practices.270   
Furthermore, under the assumption that the current Dodd-Frank 
disclosure requirements remain in place, or that the investors remain ca-
pable of obtaining asset-level disclosures, such investors should know 
exactly what they are purchasing—including the uncertainty that comes 
along with any investment.  Indeed, the ancient maxim of caveat emp-
tor271 remains deeply embedded in American jurisprudence: so, why en-
act regulations protecting a sophisticated buyer who remains unaware of 
the inherent risk and uncertainty of an investment—particularly after full 
disclosure?   
A different, more risk-averse avenue that CMBS risk-retention 
reform might take could focus on the B-piece investors and the current 
five-year holding requirement.  As the Treasury report indicated, it is un-
likely that the mandatory holding period actually needs to be five years 
to accomplish its intended purpose, and should therefore be shortened.272  
Although the Treasury suggested that the period be shortened to whatever 
amount of time that is determined necessary for the bad loans to default, 
a mandatory holding period, of any length greater than one or two years 
may nevertheless be unwarranted with respect to CMBS.273  While the 
Treasury’s recommendation would allow for a relaxed mandatory hold-
ing period for CMBS, the likely result would be that the regulatory 
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agencies would choose to err on the side of caution and require a longer 
holding period than may truly be necessary.   
Another avenue the CMBS deregulation efforts might pursue 
could be in the form of a partial exemption from the risk-retention re-
quirement limited to certain CMBS that meet the requisite specified 
standards.  This could be accomplished in a number of different ways, 
such as through an expansion of the current exemptions for qualified CRE 
loans, as was recommended by the Treasury in its report.274  For example, 
whether a CMBS transaction qualifies for a total or partial exemption 
could be based on the average credit rating of the underlying mortgages 
in the CMBS.  Alternatively, whether a CMBS qualifies for an exemption 
could be based on the average credit rating of the CMBS combined with 
an additional requirement that no tranche within the CMBS is below a 
certain rating.  While there are myriads of additional requirements and 
conditions that could theoretically flow from the structure of this ap-
proach, an overly-logistical interpretation and implementation of this rec-
ommendation would probably fail to provide the CMBS industry with 
enough relief to foster meaningful growth, which would ultimately defeat 
the purpose the purported exemption.  Therefore, under this recommen-
dation—and all recommendations for CMBS regulation for that matter—
simplicity is key.275 
No single route to CMBS deregulation can necessarily guarantee 
to be the best option for preserving the viability of the CMBS industry, 
fostering future growth, and protecting the economy from a future finan-
cial crisis until it has been implemented and put to the test.  However, one 
thing is clear: the CMBS industry did not need to be heavily regulated 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis; nor does it now under Dodd-Frank’s 
current regulatory regime. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Securitization is an essential part of the modern financial 
world.276  Although critics can easily place securitization transactions as 
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significant contributors to the 2008 financial crisis,277 there were many 
other contributing factors, such as the credit rating agencies and predatory 
and even fraudulent lending practices in the residential mortgage lending 
sector.278  Additionally, securitization should neither be overgeneralized, 
nor should the various securitization transactions be placed in the same 
category for regulatory purposes.279  Each and every regulation must be 
appropriately tailored280 to neatly fit each form of securitization it affects. 
While there is no doubt that Dodd-Frank’s purpose was to over-
haul numerous portions of the American financial system,281 it did not set 
out to dismantle it through unnecessary regulation.  Despite the gravamen 
of the Treasury’s findings and the general acquiescence that Dodd-
Frank’s regulatory burdens have negatively impacted CMBS, some nev-
ertheless continue to praise Dodd-Frank’s CMBS regulations in their cur-
rent form, and argue against abolition.282  However, it does not follow 
that the current regulations, as they are—which burden the CMBS indus-
try—should remain in full-force simply because some degree of regula-
tion is necessary.  In fact, such an argument is necessarily illogical.  For 
example, Dodd-Frank’s provisions regarding “improvements to the 
[ABS] process”283 acknowledged concerns about damaging the ABS 
markets.284  However, notwithstanding the availability of satisfying the 
risk-retention requirement through the B-piece construct, no meaningful 
exemptions have been established for CMBS.  Consequently, by leaving 
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CMBS subject to the current regulatory scheme promulgated under 
Dodd-Frank, Dodd-Frank seemingly defeats its very purpose.285 
As the Dodd-Frank debate continues, and as further repeal or 
modification looms in this era of deregulation, attention should be di-
rected toward CMBS.286  While Dodd-Frank initially provided certain ex-
emptions to its regulatory provisions for some ABS,287 and regulations 
enacted thereunder have since provided additional exemptions, it is evi-
dent that the current exemptions do not go far enough for CMBS—
particularly in the case of risk retention.  Similarly, although there have 
been recent Dodd-Frank rollbacks that loosened some of its regulatory 
pressure,288 there has yet to be any notable legislative efforts that would 
 
benefit CMBS, specifically.  Consequently, the Dodd-Frank reform ef-
forts should turn their attention to CMBS, and seek a new or expanded 
CMBS exemption from the risk-retention requirement.  
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